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How do we_come to know ourselves?

This problem

has intrigued man for thousands of years.

And as .with

many of the great philosophical questions about the ·
nature of man, social science is starting to provide
an answer.

It seems that "self-awareness, one's abil-

ity to respond differentially to his own behavior and
it's controlling variables, is a product of social
interaction" (Bem, 1965, p. 199).

One explanation of

how the social milieu affects our own self-awareness
is provided by Daryl J. Bern.
Bern's self-perception theory is relatively straightforward.

Two propositions comprise the heart of this

theory: "First, individuals come to 'know' their own
attitudes and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt
behavior and the circumstances in which it occurs&
Thus second,

to the extent that information from in-

ternal cues is weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable,
the individual is functionally in the same position
as an outside observer of his behavior, an observer
who, necessarily, must rely upon those same external
cues to infer the individual's inner states" (Bern and
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McConnell, 1970, p. 2J).

In other words, "An individu-

al's belief and attitude statements and the beliefs
and attitudes that an outside observer would make are
often functi·ona1.ly equivalent in that both sets of
statements are 'inferences' from the same evidence:
the public events that the socializing community
originally employed in training the individual to
make such self-descriptive statements" (Bem, 1965, p.

200).
This theory has received a number of applications.
First, a number of studies have shown that individuals
sometimes infer their own emotional states by observing
external cues in their environment (Bandler, Madaras,
and Bern, 1968; Berkowitz, Lepinski and Angulo, 1969;
Davison and Valins, 1969; Kopel and Arkowitz, 1974;
Misovich and Charis, 1974; Nisbett and Schacter, 1966;
Schacter, 1964; Schacter and Singer, 1962; Turner and
Berkowitz, 1972; Valins, 1966; Valins, 1967).

Kelley

(1967) integrated self-perception theory with attribution theory.

Nisbett and Valins (1971) have demon-

strated it's utility in a wide variety of situations
in v1hich self-inference.s seem to be made from overt
and autonomic behavior.

Lepper ·(1973) has shown the

applicability of self-perception theory to Freedman
and Sears' "foot-in-the-door technique."

However, the most important application of selfperception theory is to attitude formation and change.
In terms of attitude formation Bem argues that people
do indeed on occasion infer their beliefs and attitudes
from observing their own overt behavior,
when internal cues are

w~ak ~nd

or

particula~ly

~~iable.

In terms of_attitude change, Bem has attempted to
re-interpret the large corpus of cognitive dissonance
theory findings in terms of self-perception theory.
There is a heated controversy between dissonance
theorists

an~

self-perception theorists over the valid-

ity of their respective theories.

Dissonance theory,

following Festinger {1957), assumes that individuals
try to maintain some consistency in their beliefs.
"Two elements of knowledge 'are in dissonant relation .
i£, considering these two alone, the obverse of one
element would follow from the other.'

Further, dis-

sonance, 'being psychologically uncomfortable, will
motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance and
achieve consonance' and 'in addition to trying to
reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations
and information which would likely increase the dissonance•• (Zajonc, 1960, p. 190).

Simons (1971) es-

timated that over three hundred studies have supported
predictions derived from this theory.
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Attitude formation and change obviously constitute
important areas of study.

The most general and most

supported (in terms of empirical research findings)
theory of attitude change is cognitive dissonance
theory.

The most important competing theory to dis-

sonance is self-perception theory in

tha~

only the

latter attempts to explain all of the ramifications
of dissonance theory.

There are other competing

theories (chiefly reinforcement theory) but these are
only partial in scope. · Therefore, given that attitude
change constitutes an important area of study, it
seems highly desirable to know whether the most general
theory of this process (dissonance theory) or it's
chief competitor (self-perception theory) is correct.
There have been many studies conducted in an
attempt to resolve this controversy.
was conducted by Bem (1965).

The first one

In the first part of the

study, subjects were asked to state that cartoons
were either "very funny .. or "very unfunny."

Each state-

ment was made in the presence of one of two colored
lights.

One of the colored l.ights (the truth light)

signified that the subject was telling the truth.
The other light signified that the subject was making
a false statement {the lie light).

After the subject

made his statement while the light was on, he rated

5
his ••true" attitude on a rating scale.

The results

showed that the ten cartoons commented upon by the
subjects in the presence of the truth light were ranked
further from the neutral point in the direction of
self-persuasion ("very funny" or "very unfunny")
than the ten cartoons commented upon by the subject
in the presence of the lie light.

Subjects were evi-

dently inferring their beliefs from external cues,

i.e., the lights.
In the second part of this study, Bem offered
an initial alternative explanation for dissonance
theory results.

Bern did not think it was necessary

or parsimonious to postulate a drive-reduction mechanism.

Bem suggested rather that if a person behaves

counter to his attitudes, he will infer what his "true"
attitudes are from observations of his own behavior
without experiencing any aversive motivational pressure.

Any attitude change "is viewed simply as a self-

judgment based on the available evidence, evidence
that includes the apparent controlling variables of
the observed behavior" (Bem, 1967, p. 188).
Bern sought to find evidence in support of his
theory by replicating two dissonance experiments within
what he called his "interpersonal replication" paradigm.
That is, he assumed that if his interpretation of dis-
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sonance theory was correct, then external observers
should be able to accurately replicate the attitude
of one of the original dissonance experiment subjects.
In the first dissonance experiment, subjects were
offered either $.50, $1, $5. or $10 to write a counterattitudinal essay.

The results showed that attitude

change was inversely related to level of incentive.
In the second dissonance experiment, hungry subjects,
after engaging in a series of tasks, were asked to
volunteer for further testing.

Half of the subjects

were offered $5 for volunteering, half were offered
nothing.

Subjects were given a posttest on hunger

after they had volunteered.

The results showed that

those subjects who were offered the money rated themselves significantly more hungry than those who had
volunteered for nothing.

In separate studies, Bem

described these two experiments to external observers
and asked them what the· original subjects' attitudes
would have been at the end of the experiments.

In

both cases, external observers were able to closely
replicate the results obtained from the original
subjects.

From this, Bem concluded· that the judgments

made by the dissonance subjects regarding their own
behavior did not differ significantly from judgments
made by external observers.
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A follow-up study by Bern (1966) produced similar
results to the first part of the 1965 study.

Subjects

had to cross· off fifty words on a one hundred word
list.

The list- was taken away.

Using a pre-determined

schedule, the experimenter announced a word and instructed the subject either to state that he had or had
not crossed out the word earlier.

Half of these

"confessions .. were true and half were false.

The sub-

ject made his "confession". in the presence of either
a truth light or a lie light.

After each confession,

the subject entered the word onto a sheet of paper and
indicated on a five-point

seal~

how sure he was of

having crossed out the word or not.

The results sho,ved

that false confessions emitted in the presence of the
truth light produced more errors of recall than either
false confessions emitted in the presence of the lie
I

light or no control at all.

Subjects were also less

sure of their false confessions when they were made
under the truth light than when they were made under
the lie light or no light at all.
Bem's 1965 reinterpretation of dissonance theory
results is relatively loose.

He made a more rigorous

presentation in 1967 when his specific purpose was to
present an alternative explanation for dissonance theory.
Bern chose to replicate the Fes±inger and Carlsmith (1959)
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experiment in which subjects who received $1 for engaging
in counterattitudinal advocacy changed their attitudes
to match their behavior more than did subjects who
received $20 for doing the same task.
theory

Dissonance

interprets these results by assuming that sub-

jects who state that a dull task is interesting to
another person for $20 can easily justify their behavior in terms of the large reward.
justify this lie in terms of $1.

Subjects cannot

Thus they experience

dissonance (they believe one thing but are arguing
for another).

This dissonance motivates the person

to move to consonance.

The way to do this is to change

one's attitude to match the behavior, i.e., subjects
believe that the task was not so boring after all.
Bem argued that an external observer would replicate these results.

If a person sees another person

making favorable statements about a dull task for $20,
he will assume that the person does not really believe
what he is saying, that he is only doing it for the
money.

Consequently, the observer would conclude

that the individual really thinks the task is dull in
spite of what he said.

If a person says a dull task

is interesting and is only paid $1 for doing so,
though, an external observer would be more likely to
judge the person to be expressing his "true•• attitude

9

and hence would infer that attitude from the content
itself.

Bern replicated the Festinger and Carlsmith

study using his interpersonal replication paradigm.
He described

t~·his

subjects the experimental situa-

tion facing one of the participants in the dissonance
experiment and asked them to predict the participant's
attitude at the end of the experiment.

The results

were similar to Festinger and Carlsmith's results
on two separate trials.
The three studies replicated so far by Bem all
dealt with the forced compliance paradigm of dissonance
theory.

This paradigm exists when a subject is forced

by either the promise of a reward or the threat of a
punishment to argue publicly for a position he does
not believe in.

Bem also sought to replicate a study

utilizing the free choice paradigm.

In this type of

study, subjects are simply asked to make a choice
from among a number of alternatives.

Dissonance is

presumably aroused because the rejected choices contain
positive features that would have warranted their acceptance, and the chosen alternative contains negative
features that would have warranted it's rejection.
To reduce dissonance, subjects are theoretically
motivated to rate the chosen alternative as more favorable than the initial rating and the rejected alter-
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natives as more negative than their initial ratings
after the choice has been made.

External observers

of the subjects in the free choice study also replicated
the · original subjects' results.

Bern offered a theoret-

ical explanation of the selective exposure hypothesis
of dissonance theory but unfortunately did not replicate
any of the experiments in this area.
Judson Mills (1967) criticized the previous study
of Bem's by noting that Bem did not tell his subjects
what the initial attitudes of the participants in the
various dissonance experiments were.

Mills argued that

Bern's subjects could conclude that the person's liking
for the task determined how much he was paid.

Mills

concluded that "Bem has not shown that naive observ.e rs
can accurately predict the changes in liking for the
tasks found by Festinger and Carlsmith" (Mills, 1967,
p. 535) •

Bem (1967) responded to Mills by arguing that his
subjects• task was not to predict attitude change, which
is only a psychological reality to the experimenter
who can compare experimental groups with control groups.
Rather his interpersonal simulations reproduced the
phenomenology of the dissonance experiments from the
original participants' point of view.
participants' initial

attitud~s

And since

were not measured in

11

most dissonance experiments (because they were afteronly designs) , Bern obviously could not tell his observers what they were.

Because the original subjects

had no baseline-· with which to compare their attitude,
it appears that they had to infer their

attitudes

from their own behavior, even as Bern's external observers inferred the participants' attitudes from the
latter's behavior.
Jones, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna and Brehm (1968)
leveled the next attack at Bem.

Their arguments were

as follows:
The descriptions used by Bern suggest that a typical hypothetical subject would be quite unwilling
to comply with the experimenter's request in the
first place.

However, the hypothetical subject

in the description does perform the requested
behavior.

Observers should therefore in£er that

their subject was atypical and that he was initially more willing to comply than most subjects.
Further, a subject who complied for a small incentive would be seen as more atypical than a
subject who complied for a large incentive.

Our

alternative explanation asserts that Bern's observer-subjects were not behaving according to
.

his self-perception hypothesis, but rather that
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they merely judged

di~ferential

ject self-selection.

hypothetical sub-

(Jones, Linder, Kiesler,

Zanna and Brehm, 1968, p. 249) .
They then presented five experiments showing that external observers could not replicate Bern's results if
the initial attitudes of the original dissonance subjects were made salient, and that observers could
accurately predict only when there was no such manipulation.
Bern (1968) responded to Jones et al. on two levels.
First, he argued that the previous study in no way
contradicts self-perception theory.

Bern noted that

both the original dissonance experiments and his replications had subjects rate an attitude immediately after
a counterattitudinal behavior.

Engaging in such be-

havior may provide such strong cues for the experimental
subject that any control exercised by the initial
attitude would be swamped.

Therefore, when Jones et

al. made the initial attitude salient by presenting
it before the posttest, of course they made Bem's
replications impossible.

But Bem argued that such a

manipulation would also have ruined the original dissonance experiments.

He also noted that the results

of one of the author's work showed that observers can
replicate dissonance findings when given the initial
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attitude if they also can hear the subject engaging
in the counterattitudinal behavior as well.
Bern responded second by arguing that interpersonal
simulations are like computer simulations.

The ex-

perimenter must abstract what is significant from the
original behavior to construct his "program."

If the

wrong .. input statements" are selected, then the simulation will not succeed in producing ••output statements" that match the original experiment, which is
all that Jones et al. have demonstrated, according to
Bern.

Kiesler, Nisbett and Zanna (1969) provided further
support for the hypothesis that people infer their
beliefs from their behavior.

Subjects were led to

believe that they were going to deliver arguments
against air pollution for passers-by

~n

the street.

At the same time, confederates were asked to argue for
promoting auto safety.

The confederate stated that he

was willing to argue in favor of auto safety either
because (a) he believed strongly in auto safety
(belief-relevant condition); or because (b) the. experiment was scientifically valuable (belief-irrelevant
condition).

It was found that belief-relevant subjects

were more opposed to air pollution than the beliefirrelevant subjects were.

The authors made the fol-
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lowing conclusion:
Mere commitment to proselytizing behavior did not
cause subjects to believe more strongly in the
importance of combatting air pollution .... The
subjects' intentions to proselytize against air
pollution had nothing to do with their personal
views on the topic •... It was necessary to introduce a cue of belief relevance for the belief
inference to occur ...• When a model indicated that
his intentions to perform a similar task were
influenced by his convictions, subjects apparently
assumed that they were similarly motivated by
their beliefs.

(Kiesler, Nisbett and Zanna, 1969,

p. 326)

Bem and McConnell's 1970 experiment provided empirical support for Bern's (1968) reply to Jones, et
al. (1968).

In this study, the authors found that

subjects in a typical forced-compliance experiment were
not only unable to recall their premanipulation attitudes correctly, but they actually perceived their
postmanipulation attitudes as being identical to their
premanipulation attitudes.

In other words, subjects

in this dissonance experiment did not perceive any
attitude change.

This supported Bern's contention

that subjects' initial attitudes are not a salient part

15
of the interpersonal replication paradigm.
counterattitudinal behavior

appa~ently

Subjects

does cancel out

any effects of the pretest.
In all of -the studies reviewed to this point, the
two theories were not tested in paradigms where the
two would make different predictions as to the experimental outcome.

Such studies are needed it we are

to tell which theory is more viable.

Fortunately,

research has been done on the effects of five variables
about which the two theories make competing predictions.
The first of these variables is motivation.
/

Cog-

nitive dissonance theorists maintain that dissonance
causes the person to feel uncomfortable.

He is thus

motivated to reduce the unpleasantness by changing his
attitude.

Self-perception theory maintains that the

individual simply infers his belief from his behavior
without experiencing any such pressure.

Thus, if it

can be shown that dissonance is a state that does indeed possess motivational properties, self-perception
theory would suffer a major setback.

Six studies have

shown that dissonance is such a state.
The first is by Waterman and Katkin (1967).

In

this experiment, subjects wrote a counterattitudinal
essay.

Then they had to learn either a simple or a

complex task.

Since Hull-Spence drive theory predicts
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that high-drive states have an energizing effect upon
dominant, well-learned responses, Waterman and Katkin
predicted enhanced learning of the simple task and
decreased learning of the complex task.

The results

showed that dissonance-aroused subjects did indeed
learn the simple task better than control subjects
but there was no interference with the learning of the
complex task.

Thus dissonance theory predictions were

only partially upheld.
Cottrell and Wack (1967) manipulated justification
for performing a word learning task within a dissonance
framework.

Prior to the task high dissonance subjects

were told that they would not get promised classroom
credit for performing the experiment and that the study
they were participating in was not particularly meaningful.

Low dissonance subjects were read a neutral

passage.

Subjects were then required to learn ten

Turkish words that were presented in varying frequencies to the subjects (i.e., subjects learned the
words to differing degrees) .

The dependent measure

was the number of times words of each training frequency
\vere emitted on "pseudo-recognition" trials.

On these

trials, subjects believed they were viewing the words
subliminally but actually nonsense words were presented.

It was found that, consistent with Hull-Spence
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drive theory, dissonance enhanced the emission of words
that had been learned better and reduced the emission
of words that were not learned as well.
Pallak, Brock and Kiesler (1967) found in five
separate experiments that high choice subjects retained
paired associates words better than did low choice
subjects.

These results are consistent with the dis-

sonance theory prediction that subjects often will seek
to avoid dissonance by concentrating on the task.

The

authors ruled out the following alternative explanations
based on data gathered in the five experiments: differential rehearsel of the words, anticipation of the
recall measure, differential attractiveness of the
words, method of presentation of material, subject
attrition, variation in the confederate's behavior,
low choice subject hostility and differential reward
for participation.

It is not known how self-percep-

tion theory would account for these results.
Waterman (1969) manipulated three variables in a
2 x 2 x 2 factorial design.

Subjects were randomly

assigned to either a dissonant or consonant condition
in which they were either simply committed to or both
committed to and actually wrote an essay, after which
they engaged in either a simple or complex word learning
task.

Waterman predicted that if dissonance truly did
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have drive-arousing properties, then it would enhance
performance on the simple task and impede performance
on the complex task.

The results showed that, as pre-

dicted, dissonance subjects took fewer trials than the
consonant group on the simple task and more trials than
the consonant group on the complex task.

The dissonance

x task interaction was marginally significant, F (1,112)=

J.79,

~ (.10.

In terms of the number of errors made

while accomplishing the task, the dissonant group made
fewer errors than the consonant group on the simple
task and more on the complex task.
task interaction was significant, F

B

The dissonance x
(1,112)

= 5.63,

<.os.
The fifth study of dissonance motivation was con-

ducted by Cottrell, Rajecki and Smith in 1974.
subjects participated in the experiment.
ranked twelve consumer items.

Forty

All subjects

Half of the subjects

were required to choose between two closely rated items
thus experiencing post-decision dissonance, while the
other half did not do so.

All subjects then were

required to learn ten nonsense words that subjects
learned at differential levels (some of the words were
learned better than others).

Finally, all subjects

ranked the twelve consumer items again.

Compared to the

no-dissonance condition, the post-decision dissonance
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subjects gave more verbal responses of words that they
had learned better which (according to Hull-Spence
theory) indicates the presence of increased drive.

The

dissonance subJects also produced the usual dissonance
reduction results by increasing the desirability of the
chosen alternative, and decreasing the desirability of
the rejected alternative.
Zanna and Cooper (1974) conducted the sixth study
designed to test the notion that dissonance has arousal
properties.
design.

Two variables were manipulated in a 2 x 3

Subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under

conditions of high choice or low choice.

All of the

subjects took a pill prior to writing the essay.

One-

third of the subjects were led to believe that the pill
would make them relaxed, one-third believed it would
make them tense and the final third were led to believe
the pill would have no effect.

The results conformed

to dissonance theory predictions.

In the no-effect

condition, the standard dissonance effect was found.
That is, high-choice subjects agreed more with the
position taken in their counterattitudinal essay than
did low-choice subjects.

In the arousal condition,

subjects could attribute their arousal to the pill and
the dissonance effect in terms of attitude change was
eliminated.

In the relaxed condition, the dissonance
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effect was magnified.

The authors reasoned that subjects

who felt arousal after vrriting the counterattitudinal
essay despite the fact that they were supposed to feel
relaxed would find more of a need to change their
attitudes.

Notice that while this experiment does

support dissonance theory predictions, it does so only
to the extent that attribution theory (of which selfperception theory is a special case) is correct.
Arrowood, Wood and Ross (1970) developed the second

sa area of competitive prediction when they attempted to
show that dissonance results would ensue even if there
was no behavior from which to infer beliefs.

Theoreti-

cally, self-perception theory could not account for
such results.

All subjects were told that they would

prepare to take one of two IQ tests but that only some
of them would be taking the prepared-for test; the rest
would be taking the second test, for which their preparation would be irrelevant.

Half of the subjects were

led to believe that they would have to spend thirty to
thirty-five minutes memorizing words in preparation for
the test.

The other half of the subjects were led to

believe that they would simply have to read over the
words once.

The results showed that high-anticipated-

effect subjects were more likely than low-anticipatedeffect subjects to predict that they would \ITite the
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preparation-relevant IQ test.

However, when these

subjects were asked to predict which test other subjects would take, these results were not replicated.

In fact, there was no consistent pattern of response.
The authors interpreted these findings as supporting
dissonance theory.

They reasoned that subjects felt

aversive motivational pressure themselves to reduce the
dissonance, pressure that did not generalize to perceptions of others.
However, Williams, Crawford and Haaland (1974)
pointed out three problems with the Arrowood, et al.
study:
To test self-perception, subjects should not have
been asked to predict a chance event but, instead,
asked "Which of the tests do you think he thinks
he vvill write?"

Second, it follows from dissonance

theory that high effort subjects should have both
expected and preferred the appropriate test.
difference in preference was found.

No

Moreover,

the running procedure confounded experimenter
and/or running time with the critical effort
manipulation.

(Williams, Crawford and Haaland,

1974, p. 319)
The authors ran a study identical to the Arrowood,
et al. study but with corrections of the above three
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errors.

The results showed that high effort subjects

indicated greater anticipated effort than low effort
subjects.

Yet both groups expected their chances of

getting the preparation-relevant test to be fiftyfifty.

Likewise, both groups predicted that other s ub-

jects would also expect fifty-fifty odds.

And

cant~

to dissonance theory predictions, high effort subjects
preferred the effortless task significantly more than
low effort subjects.

Thus it is questionable whether

the Arrowood, et al. study gives support to dissonance
theory over self-perception theory.
The third variable is the illusion of uniqueness.
Cooper, Jones and Tuller (1972) conducted a study to
determine if it makes a difference in terms of2.attitude
change if the subject thinks he is relatively unique
in complying with the experimenter's request to participate in the experiment.

In a 2 x 3 design, the ex-

perimenters manipulated the level of incentive ($2. 50
or $.50) and the perceived uniqueness of subjects.

For

the latter variable, subjects perceived themselves as
either unique (situational cues indicated that proportionally very few students contacted had volunteered
to engage in counterattitudinal behavior); non-unique
(situational cues indicated that proportionately most
students contacted had volunteered to participate in
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the experiment); or neutral (there was no mention of
the compliance rate of other students).

The results

showed the typical effect of incentive in dissonance
experiments, i.e., $.50 subjects changed their attitudes
more than did $2.50 subjects in the direction of their
counterattitudinal behavior.
icant effect.

Uniqueness had no signif-

The authors interpreted this as being

evidence against self-perception theory.

However, the

whole experiment was based on a faulty assumption.
The authors stated that:
If a subject agrees to perform an attitude-discrepant task and is told that he is virtually the
only person to comply with the experimenter's
request, then according to

~elley's

attributional

interpretation (but not dissonance theory), he
should manifest considerable change in the· direction of his behavior regardless of the amount of
incentive he is offered for his compliance. · On
the other. hand, if the subject is made to believe
that all persons who were requested to perform the
task consented to do so, then the attributional
view would hold that subjects will make an entity
attribution and be no more in agreement with the
attitude-discrepant position than subjects in a
control group.

(Cooper, Jones and Tuller, 1972,
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p. 49)

Yet two pages back the authors indicated what Kelley's
position really

_i~:

According to Kelley, when an individual observes
himself performing a counterattitudinal task in a
forced-compliance situation, he must decide whether
to make an entity or a person attribution.

He must

ask himself, "Did I behave this way because anyone
would have under the circumstances or did I do
something that very few others would have done?" ...
The inverse relationship between incentive and
attitudes is seen as a function of the covariation
between incentive and the illusion of uniqueness:
as the incentive for compliance is reduced, the
illusion of uniqueness is increased.

For dissonance

theory, the illusion of uniqueness is largely
irrelevant since subjects' attitudes are a function of their own behaviors and beliefs rather
than the behavior of others.

(Cooper, Jones and

Tuller, 1972, pp. 47-48)
Kelley's formulation is that subjects perceive the level
of incentive and then make an attribution of uniqueness
dependent upon that perception.

There are two reasons

why this experiment does not constitute a valid test
of this formulation.

First, subjects in this experiment
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do not make an attribution of uniqueness based upon the
level of incentive as required by Kelley.

The attribu-

tion is based rather on the ratio of acceptance to refusal slips.

Second, Kelley defined the attribution

of uniqueness as being dependent upon the level of incentive.

Yet in this experiment the two are manipulated

independently of each other.

A more valid test of

attribution theory would be to force subjects to engage
in counterattitudinal essay writing and then ask them
to indicate the percentage of subjects they think complied with the experimenter's request to participate in
the experiment.

This figure should then be compared to

a similar guess made by subjects who did not engage
in counterattitudinal essay

v~iting.

The fourth variable about which dissonance and selfperception theories make . competing predictions is commitment.

Kiesler, Roth and Pallak (1974) conducted two

experiments manipulating commitment to determine whether
dissonance or self-perception . theory best explained the
results.

In the first experiment, subjects were com-

mitted to reading a speech consonant with their opinions
either publicly (high commitment) or privately (low
commitment).

After commitment but prior to the reading,

subjects were given a choice of two tasks to perform.
The first would make the subject think about how others
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would react to the content of the recorded speech.

The

second task was a nonsense-syllable one irrelevant to
the commitment.

Attribution theory predicts that sub-

.jects would choose the first task.

Selective exposure

studies suggest that subjects would choose the second
task.

The results showed that as the level of commit-

ment increased, · fewer

subject~

chose the relevant task.

In other words, under conditions of high commitment,
subjects are unlikely to engage in any behavior that
would force critical self-examination of one's beliefs.
Experiment two consisted of two parts.
part simply replicated experiment one.

The first

In the second

part, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
commitment conditions: high, low and none.

Prior to

recording the speech, subjects in the high and low
conditions had the choice of either completing the same
boring irrelevant task as used previously in experiment
one, or a relevant task which allowed subjects to reinterpret their prior behavior (the commitment) as attitudinally innocuous.

As predicted, when faced with

the choice between a dull task and one which forced
consideration of one's commitment, highly-committed
subjects chose the irrelevant dull task.

However, when

given a choice between the same dull task and one which
allowed the innocuous reinterpretation, highly committed
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· subjects chose the latter.
The authors were quick to point out that this study
does not support dissonance theory because consonant
--

behavior was manipulated in this study, not dissonant
behavior.
The authors concluded that several assumptions should

be added to the process of self-attribution:
(a) Often attitudes are not well articulated;
(b) As a result, the attitudinal implications of
one's actions are often ambiguous to self; and
(c) When the implications of one's actions could
be negative, the implications are not passively
accepted.

Instead, one often avoids thinking about

the implications or strives actively to reinterpret
the original behavior.

Perhaps the cognitive con-

sequences of attributional manipulations do not
occur until or unless the experimenter forced them
by asking questions the subject is trying to avoid.

(I<:iesler, Roth and Pallak, 1974, p. 714)
The fifth variable is the reinstatement of initial
subject attitudes.

Self-perception theory predicts that

reminding the subject of his initial attitude would
eliminate the dissonance effect.
The failure of Jones et al. to replicate dissonance
:findings when a conflicting "initial" attitude of
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the subject is made salient for the observer, suggests that a similar salience manipulation introduced into the original dissonance study just prior
to the final attitude assessment would similarly
destroy the original experimental finding.

That

is, the data of Jones et al. can be viewed as
evidence in favor of our original decision to
regard the initial attitudes of subjects as nonsalient in their postmanipulation phenomenology,
and as evidence against the guess of Jones et al.
that these attitudes are salient.
p.

(Bem. 1967,

271)

Dissonance theory, on the other hand, predicts that
there will be even more attitude change in the direction of the counterattitudinal behavior because subjects
will be reminded all the more clearly of the contradiction between their attitude and their behavior.
Harris and Tamler {1971) conducted the first study
of this issue.

In their study, subjects completed a

pretest on a topic one day during class.

One week later,

when they reported for the experiment, they were
reminded of \vhat their initial attitude \vas, and then
\vere aslced to \vri te a counteratti tudinal essay on the
topic for either $2.50 or $.50.
a posttest on the key item.

Subjects then completed

The results showed that
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there was more attitude change in the low incentive
condition than in the high incentive condition.

The

authors concluded that dissonance theory was supported
over self-perception theory.
The second study of reinstated initial attitudes
was done by Snyder and Ebbeson (1972).

All subjects

participated in counterattitudinal essay writing.
There were two independent variables.

Two levels of

choice were manipulated: choice and no choice.

There

were four levels of salience: nothing salient, attitudes
salient, behavior salient, and both attitude and
behavior salient.

A no-essay control group was included

as a reference point.

The results showed that when

neither attitudes nor behavior were salient, subjects
agreed with their . essays more under choice than under
no choice conditions.
outcome.

Both theories had predicted this

When initial attitudes were made salient,

choice subjects agreed less with their essays and no
choice subjects agreed more with their essays than when
initial attitudes were not made salient.

Dissonance

theory predictions were directly contradicted by these
findings.

Self-perception theory was supported by

. these results, but not for the reasons Bem would have
cited.

Both theories predicted that behavior salience

would increase the effect of choice.

However, the re-
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sults showed that this variable had no effect on final
attitudes.

The authors explained these findings by

simply extending self-perception theory:
In self-perception theory, perception of the behavior is a constant and choice is thought to
determine the relevance of the behavior to the
attitude judgment.

In the present approach,

perception of the behavior is not constant.
Instead, choice determines perception of the behavior which in turn determines the attitude estimate.

Thus, choice mediates perception of be-

havior rather than (or possibly in addition to)
perception of attitude.

(Snyder and Ebbeson, 1972,

p. 514)

Bem (1972) simply reviewed the Snyder and Ebbeson
experiment, indicated that the results were equivocal
and noted that Snyder and Ebbeson proposed their own
model of self-perception.

He concluded that the clash

between dissonance theory and self-perception theory
was not as important as other unexplored areas of selfperception theory and that he will have nothing more
to do with the conflict.
Ross and Shulman (1973) manipulated two variables
in a third study of this issue.

Subjects had to write

counterattitudinal essays under conditions of either
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choice or no choice.

They were either shown or not

shown their initial attitudes (which had been obtained
a week earlier) immediately before the posttest.
results

supported- ~he

The

dissonance theory prediction:

increasing the salience of premanipulation attitudes
did not reduce the dissonance effect whatsoever.
Green {1974) also examined the effects of initial
attitudes upon attitude change within the forced compliance paradigm.

However, Green examined the effect

of the extremity of initial attitudes, rather than
their reinstatement, upon attitude change.
ted two variables in a 2 x 2 design.

He manipula-

Subjects were

assigned to either a high thirst condition or a low
thirst condition.

Subjects were promised either $2.50

or $.50 to engage in a future water-deprivation experiment.

Acc.ording to Green, self-perception theory

predicts that the extremity of initial attitude should
have no effect upon attitude change whereas dissonance

theory predicts that (1) the more extreme the initial
attitude, the more subjects should change their attitudes in the direction of their counterattitudinal
behavior; and (2) there should be a significant interaction between incentive and extremity of initial at-

titudes.

The results supported the dissonance theory

predictions.
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Because of the inability of the last four studies
to resolve the theoretical conflict surrounding reinstatement of initial attitudes, this author feels
-.-

that another study of that topic is jusfified.

Because

the Green study does not actually deal with reinstated
initial attitudes, it will not be considered further.
The remaining three studies generated contradictory
results.

The Harris and Tamler and Ross and Shulman

studies supported dissonance theory while the Snyder
and Ebbeson experiment was largely in support of selfperception theory.

These conflicting findings can be

explained in part by methodological differences among
the studies.

Each study had a different operational

definition of reinstated initial attitudes.

Snyder

and Ebbeson operationally defined reinstatement of
initial attitudes as making subjects think about what
their attitude was before they wrote their counterattitudinal essay.

Harris and Tamler defined the vari-

able as showing subjects their pretest score before
they

¥~ote

their essays.

Ross and Shulman also

showed their subjects their pretest scores but did so
after they wrote their essays but before the posttest.
Since the latter two experiments both generated .dissonance results, it is possible that it is the manipulation itself rather than when it occurs that is the
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critical factor.
The difference between the two manipulations is
that in the Snyder and Ebbeson experiment, subjects
-.

-

think about their attitudes without making an overt
behavioral commitment to those attitudes (such as
w~rking

an attitude scale).

In the other two experiments,

subjects do indicate their attitudes on an attitude
scale pretest.

This means that subjects in the Harris

and Tamler and Ross and Shulman experiments made a

commitment to their attitudes that the Snyder and
Ebbeson subjects did not make.
This difference in the level of commitment in the
experiments could account for the contradictory findings, particularly in light of the Kiesler, Roth and
Pallak (1974) results.

As noted previously, these

researchers found that the more committed a subject
was to his own attitudes, the less likely he was to
test his beliefs by thinking about them and to undergo
the belief-inference process.

If this analysis is

correct, then subjects who are simply asked to think
about their beliefs before engaging in counterattitudinal
behavior should not generate dissonance results.

Sub-

jects who are shown pretests indicating their initial
beliefs on attitude scales should generate dissonance
results.
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More importantly, though, this author believes
that all of the previous authors have overlooked a
most important factor in the self-perception process.
All of them have ignored how certain a subject. is of
his pretest attitude rating.
lowing situation:

Let us suppose the fol-

a subject indicates his attitude

on a seven-point scale but is totally uncertain of what
his attitude is.

He is marking the scale only because

the experimenter has asked him to do so.

He then

engages in counter-attitudinal behavior, and is shown
his pretest.
is new.

He is asked to indicate what his attitude

It seems obvious to this author that the pre-

test will not affect the attitude inference process
in this situation because the pretest does not provide
any valid information for the subject from which to

make an inference.

Given the choice of whether to make

an inference from an uncertain attitude statement (based
upon weak internal cues) or a certain behavior (based
upon strong external cues) the subject will infer his
belief from his behavior and dissonance results will
still be generated.
Only when the subject is certain of his pretest
rating will reinstatement of that rating interfere with
the inference-making process.

Self-perception theory

states that a person will infer his beliefs from ex-
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ternal cues only when internal cues are weak.

Co~

versely, when internal cues are strong, subjects
tend to ignore external cues.

wi~l

j

Reinstatement of an

opinion about which one is certain is nothing more than
the reinstatement of a strong internal cue.

Given such

a cue, subjects will tend to ignore counterattitudinal
behavior.

In other words, dissonance results will not

be generated in this latter case.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of topic certainty, counterattitudinal advocacy
and reinstatement

o~

initial attitudes upon attitude

change, and to determine whether dissonance or self-

perception theory is more parsimonious in explaining
the results.
The hypotheses are as follows:

(1) Subjects in the premanipulation attitude
salience-pretest cells will evidence significantly
greater attitude change in the direction of their
counterattitudinal essays than will subjects in the
corresponding control group.
This hypothesis is based on the Harris and Tamler (1971)
and Ross and Shulman (1973) findings with a possible
explanation provided by the Kiesler, Roth and Pallak

(1974) study.
(2) Subjects in the premanipulation attitude
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salience-think about/certain topic condition will
not show any significantly greater attitude change
in the direction of their counterattitudinal
essay than will subjects in the corresponding
control group.
This hypothesis is based on the Snyder and Ebbeson (1972)
study and on the author's own analysis of self-perception
theory as explained previously.

(3) Subjects in the premanipulation attitude
salience-think about/uncertain topic condition
will show significantly greater attitude change
in the direction of their counterattitudinal essay
than will subjects in the corresponding control
group.
Hypothesis two is the critical one in terms of
the dissonance/self-perception theory controversy.
is based on self-perception theory predictions.

It

A

failure to support this hypothesis would thus be support
for dissonance theory.
Both theories predict hypotheses one and three
according to this analysis.

Failure to support one

of these hypotheses would thus constitute a blow to
both theories.
Method
Overview of Design
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This study was a modified 2 x 2 x 4 design.

The

independent variables were topic certainty, counterattitudinal advocacy, and premanipulation attitude
salience.

The dependent variable was attitude change.

See Appendix A for further clarification.
Subjects
Eighty-eight undergraduate students enrolled in
beginning speech courses at Florida Technological
University served as subjects in this experiment.
This allowed the assignment of six subjects per cell.
They participated in the study to fulfill the experimental participation opportunity of the course.
Independent Variables
Topic certainty.
defined in terms

o~

This variable was

a pilot study.

opera~ionally

This author made

up a list of thirty topics that he considered to be
counterattitudinal for most college students.

These

were presented to twenty-three beginning speech
students.

They rated the topics on two seven-point

semantic differential scales.
disagree scale.
scale.

The first was an agree-

The second was a certain-uncertain

The author selected from this list two topics

that were nearly equally counterattitudinal but as
widely separated on the certain-uncertain scale as
possible.

There were thus two levels of topic cer-
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tainty: certain and uncertain.

The pilot was run

one week before the actual experiment.

To further

increase the spread between certain and uncertain
groups, the subjects in the certain group were provided
with an informative paragraph on their topic to read
before writing their counterattitudinal essays (in
cells one through four) or before the posttest {in
cells five and six).
Counterattitudinal advocacy.

This variable was

operationally defined in terms of counterattitudinal
essay writing.

Those subjects who experienced the coun-

terattitudinal behavior wrote the essay.

Of course,

those subjects who did not have such an experience
did not vrrite the essay.

There were thus two conditions:

essay and no essay.
Reinstatement of initial attitudes.
four levels of this variable.

There were

The first corresponded

to the Harris and Tamler (1971) study.

That is, sub-

jects first filled out a pretest on the key topic
item.

They were then shown that score one week later

immediately after which they wrote the counterattitudinal
essay.

Subjects then completed the posttest.

The

second level corresponded to the Ross and Shulman (1973)
study.

This level was identical to level one except

that the subjects were shown their pretest score after

39
their essay writing but before the posttest.

The third

level corresponded to the Snyder and Ebbeson (1972)
study.

In this level, subjects were instructed to think

carefully about their attitude on the topic after which
they wrote their essay.
posttest.

Subjects then completed the

The fourth level was a control condition in

which there was no attitude salience manipulation.
Dependent Variable and Manipulation Checks
The dependent variable was attitude change.

It

was operationally defined in terms of pretest and
posttest scores.

The pretest was identical to the ques-

tionnaire used in the pilot study.

The posttest con-

tained the attitude scale for either the certain or
uncertain topic and in addition contained the following: a semantic differential scale (comfortableuncomfortable) to check on the dissonance manipulation;
a question asking the subjects to indicate what their
initial attitudes were on the key item; and a semantic
differential scale (very little-very much) for subjects
to indicate how much they thought about their attitudes
before they wrote their essays.

These checked the

dissonance manipulation, how much subjects remember
their initial attitude, and the premanipulation attitude
salience-think about manipulation, respectively.

The

topic certainty manipulation was automatically checked
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since both pretest and posttest contained the certainty
scale.

The attitude salience-pretest manipulation was

checked by simply observing whether subjects correctly
recorded their pretest scores on their essays.
Procedure
The procedural order is summarized in Appendix A.
There were four paragraphs of instructions that
were used in various combinations for all of the subjects.

They were as follows:

Paragraph one.

This is a preliminary study of

university students' attitudes towards various topics.
Please write in the upper left hand corner of the first
page the last four digits of your social security number, and the course and section number.

This is

strictly for data organization purposes within the
experiment.

I will make no attempt to find out who

any of you are.

Indeed, with only four numbers I

could not do so even if I wanted to.
topics on these sheets.

Please notice that there are

topics on both sides of the sheets.
carefully.
scales.

There are thirty

Please read each one

After you read each one, you will find two

First indicate by circling the appropriate

number how much you agree or disagree with the topicp
One indicates maximum disagreement, seven indicates
maximum agreement while four is the neutral point

41
indicating you neither agree nor disagree with the
statement.

The other numbers represent either increasing

agreement or disagreement.

Please consider all of the

factors for and against each topic before marking your
answer.

After you finish the first scale, indicate

on the second scale how certain you are of your answer
on the first scale.

Scale markings are similar, with

one indicating maximum uncertainty, seven maximum
certainty and four is the neutral point.

Please consider

carefully how much you actually know about each topic
before marking the second scale.

Continue in this manner

until you have completed all thirty items.

It should

take you fifteen minutes or less to answer all thirty
items.

Are there any questions?

Paragraph two.

This week we are collecting argu-

ments for and against the various positions expressed
in the previous questionnaire.

It has been found that

one of the best ways to get all of the arguments on
both sides of an issue is to have people write an essay
on only one side.

So I would appreciate it if you

would write an essay which argues as convincingly as
possible that {either the certain or uncertain topic
was inserted here).
paper.

Please write it on this sheet of

You may use the back if necessary.

Paragraph three.

Here are your original ques-·
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tionnaires.

Would each of you look on his or her ques-

tionnaire, find the question that · is relevant to the
topic of the essay, record the number of the question

--

and your attitude score in the spaces provided below
to make our computations easier?
Paragraph four.

Before proceeding further, take

a few minutes to think about and organize your thoughts
and views on the above stated topic.

(At this point,

several questions were asked suggesting possible dimensions of the topic for the student to consider) .

DO

NOT PROCEED FURTHER UNTIL YOU HAVE FULLY ORGANIZED
YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS ISSUE.

Once you have organized

your thoughts, then proceed to write the essay.
The instructions in paragraph one were made up
by the present author.

The instructions in paragraphs

two and three were taken and modified from the Ross
and Shulman (1973) study, while the instructions in
paragraph four were taken literally from the Snyder and
Ebbeson (1972) study.
Subjects in cells one, two, five, seven, eight and
eleven were given the pretest with the instructions in
paragraph one.

One week later, the rest of the experi-

mental manipulations were run.

Subjects in cells one

and seven were shown their pretests and given the
instructions in paragraph two.

They wrote their essay
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following the instructions in paragraph three.

Sub-

jects in cells two and eight simply reversed this
order.

Subjects in cells three and nine received the

instructions in paragraph four and then wrote their
essay after receiving the instructions in paragraph
two.

Subjects in cells four and ten received the in-

structions in paragraphs one and two.

Subjects in

cells five and eleven were given the instructions
in paragraph three.

Subjects in cells six and twelve

got the instructions in paragraph four.

Subjects in

cells thirteen and fourteen were given the instructions
in paragraph one.
After all manipulations, all subjects filled out
the posttest.
Students were randomly assigned to cells within
pretest and no pretest blocks.

The reason for assigning

within blocks was that it would have been impossible
to keep non-pretested students from being contaminated

if pretested and non-pretested students had been mixed.
Data Analysis
The data analysis was run as follows: (a) a t-test
was run between cells thirteen and fourteen to determine
if the pretest had any significant effect upon attitude
change; (b)analysis of variance tests were run on the
three independent variables to determine main effects;
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and (c) t-tests were run on the following pairs of
cell means to test the three hypotheses:
1. hypothesis one
a. one and nine
b. two and nine
c. five and eleven
d. six and eleven
2. hypothesis two - three and ten

J.

hypothesis three - seven and twelve.
Results

Manipulation Checks
Counterattitudinal advocacy.

Three separate indices

indicated that this manipulation was effective.

First,

all experimental subjects who took the pretest disagreed with the two topics.

Thus the topics proved

to be counterattitudinal just as they did in the pilot
study.

Second, all forty-eight subjects asked to write

counterattitudinal essays did so.
theory predicts that

v~iting

And third, dissonance

a counterattitudinal essay

produces drive, an uncomfortable state.

Subjects who

wrote the counterattitudinal essay were significantly
more uncomfortable than those who did not do so,
F (1,86)

= 12.2329, E <.ool.

Thus the counterattitudinal

advocacy manipulation seems to have been effective.
Reinstatement of initial attitude.

All forty-four
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subjects in the pretest conditions c·opied their pretest scores correctly.
effective.

This manipulation was thus

The mean for all subjects in the think

about condition on- the think about scale was 4.00.
Subjects in this condition wrote longer essays than
subjects in any other reinstatement condition (see
Table 6) .

An analysis of variance between the think

about cells versus the other reinstatement conditions
did not reveal any significant differences, F (1,46) -

.9334, 4.08 critical valus.

An analysis of variance

of the four reinstatement conditions also showed nonsignificant differences, although the relationship
was stronger than the previous one, F (3,44)

2.84 critical value (see Table 11).

= 1.7867,

Although the

latter F-tests did not reveal significant differences,
this does not mean that the think about manipulation
was ineffective.

Since all of the think about means

were rather high, it seems more reasonable to conclude
that non-think about subjects also put some thought
into their essays, even though they were not specifically instructed to do so, rather than that the think
about subjects did not think about their essays.
Based upon the fact that think about subjects had a
high think about mean and wrote the longest essays,
it seems that the think about manipulation was at
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least marginally effective.
Topic certainty.

The two topics chosen were

"Alcoholic beverages should be banned from the FTU
campus," and "Power -plants should be allowed to burn
high sulfur coal even if more air pollution is created."
In the pilot study (N=2J) it \vas found that the two
topics were nearly equally counterattitudinal (means
of 1.82 and 1.87 respectively on the attitude scale).
The two topics were the most divergent on the certainty
scale of the thirty pretested topics (means of 6.00
and 5.04 respectively).

The difference between the

two topics was just short of statistical significance,
F (1,44)
12).

= ).8274,

critical valus of 4.08 (see Table

However, this difference all but

disap~eared

on

the posttest for the experimental groups, E (1,86) -

.2943, critical value of 4.00 (see Table 13).

The means

were 6.05 on the certain topic and 5.91 for the uncertain topic.

Thus most of the change was accounted

for by stud.ents v1ho became more certain about the
uncertain topic.

Since the pilot and the

experimenta~

groups were all run within one week of each other, and
no major events occurred during those two weeks that
would change students' attitudes toward either topic,
it does not seem that the . subjects' history accounted
for such a change.

It would seem rather that the dif-
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ference was due simply to chance variation.
Effects on Dependent Variables
Pretest effects.

Comparisons of cells thirteen

--

and fourteen revealed no significant effects of the
pretest on the posttest in terms of attitude change.
The means did not differ significantly on either the

= .2254,

certain topic, t (6)
t (6)

=

.2767.

or the uncertain topic,

Similarly, no significant effects oc-

curred on the certainty scale.

The means did not differ

significantly on either the certain topic, t(6) -

.2926, or the uncertain topic, t (6) = 1.5163.
Essay

length~

There were no significant dif-

ferences in the length of essays between conditions.
The mean essay lengths between reinstatement conditions
on the certain topic did not differ significantly,

f {1,46)

=

.3854 (see Table 16).

These non-significant

differences were due more to the large

within ~· cells

variation than to the lack of variation between cells.
The range of essay lengths was from fifteen to two
hundred twelve words.

Lengths were widely scattered

throughout this range, thus indicating that there
v1as a \Vide variation in the degree to which subjects
engaged in counterattitudinal behavior.
Attitude change.

No significant main effects were

found for any of the three independent variables.

The
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difference between certain and uncertain groups was
very insignificant, F (1,86) - .0396 (see Table 17).
Surprisingly, there was also no difference in attitude

=

scores between essay and no essay groups, F (1,86)

.1)24 (see Table 18).

Reinstatement of initial at-

titudes also had no significant effect upon attitude
change, F (2,86) = 1.5540 (see Table 19).

Counter-

attitudinal advocacy had no significant effect upon
attitude change on both the certaip topic, F {1,42) -

.9238 (see Table 20), and the uncertain topic, F
(1,42) = .J400 (see Table 21).
Hypothesis one predicted that there would be a
significant difference between apy group of subjects
who were shown their pretests and wrote a counterattitudinal essay and the appropriate control group
in terms of their attitude scores.

Four cell comparisons

were made to test this hypothesis.

All .....t-tests were

one-tailed.

There was a significant difference in the

meanattitude scores of cells one and four, t {10)
1.8J, p (.05.

=

There were no significant differences

in the other three comparisons: cells two and four,
t {10)

=

.1190; cells seven and ten, t {10)

and cells eight and ten, t (10) = .6942.

= 1.0397;

Hypothesis

one was thus only partially confirmed.
Hypothesis two predicted a 'significant difference
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between cells three and four.
occurred, t (10)

No such difference

= .JJ67.

Hypothesis three predicted no significant dif.....

ference between cells nine and ten.
t (10)

This was confirmed,

= .6099.

However, these predictions were based upon the
assumption that cells four and ten would differ
nificantly from their control groups.
ferences occurred.

sig~· 

No such dif-

Cell four did not differ signifi-

cantly from cell fourteen, t (8)

= .8546,

and cell

ten did not differ significantly from cell fourteen,

t (8)

= .)780.

Because this assumption was not con-

firmed, none of the hypothesis confirmations may be
regarded as valid.
Contrary to the Bem and McConnell (1970) study,
forty-three out of forty-four pretested subjects did
remember their pretest scores.
The only significant findings involving individual
cell comparisons revolved around cells one and eight.
Cell one differed significantly from cell four, t

(10)

= 1.8278,

~~.05;

from cell five, t (10)

E (.05; and from cell two, t (10)

= 2.5743,

= 2.9854, B< .01.

Cell eight just missed statistical significance in differing from cells seven and eleven, t (10)
for both .comparisons.

= 1.7056,
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Discussion
Both dissonance and self-perception theories seem
highly inadequate to explain the behavior observed in
this experiment in -that none of the hypotheses derived
from these two theories was upheld.
The main failure that needs to be explained is
why subjects who wrote counterattitudinal essays, despite
the fact that they felt very uncomfortable as predicted
by dissonance theory, failed to change their attitudes.
This fact is made more graphic by the finding that
forty out of forty-four pretested subjects replicated
their pretest scores on both the attitude and certainty
scales of the posttest.

Of the four who changed their

attitudes, three changed in the direction of their
essay, while one changed counter to the essay.
combination of four factors
this outcome.

seems ~ to

A

have brought about

The first factor is the extremely wide

range of both essay length and quality.

Due to the

wide variation in commitment to and actual encoding of
the counterattitudinal essays randomly distributed
in the sample, one could only expect a wide variation
due to chance in attitude change.

If attitude change

scores are randomly distributed in a sample, of course
no main effects will show up in the data analysis.
As to why there was such a disparity in essay length
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in the first place, no satisfactory answer can be given.
The instructions used in this study were the same as
those used in the Ross and Shulman study which supposedly
generated fairly consistent, high quality essays.

It

is hard to accept the suggestion that FTU students
simply are more obtuse than subjects than subjects
used in previous dissonance studies.
Second, most of the subjects in this experiment
had extreme attitude scores and were quite certain
of these scores despite the fact that they knew very
little about either topic, particularly the uncertain
topic.

The fact that subjects knew very little about

either topic is supported by several qualitative observations.

First, several subjects - refused to write

the counterattitudinal essay saying that they did
not know enough about the topic.

But they filled out

the posttest and marked an extreme attitude position
about which they were quite sure.

Second, most of the

essays were of rather poor quality.

Very few arguments

were devised; those arguments that were presented were
thinly supported.

Third, many subjects who wrote the

counterattitudinal essay did so only after complaining
that they did not know anything about the topic.

Thus

the attitude statements obviously constituted strong
internal cues for most subjects.

Given such dogmatic,
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highly certain extreme attitudes, it does seem likely
-

that most people would do everything possible to replicate
their pretest scores.

This is at least interpretable

from a self-perception theory point of view.

The more

committed a person is to his attitude and the stronger
an internal cue is, the less likely the person is to
undergo the self-perception process.
Third, given that the subjects had such certain ,
extreme attitudes, it appears that \ITiting the c ounterattitudinal essay was not defined by the sub j ects a t
the level of their own self-concepts.

Both di ss onance

and self-perception theories require subjects to consider the justification f or writing a counterattitudinal
essay.

In this experiment, it is doubtful whether the

subjects ever got that far.

In this case, they simply

willingly obeyed the experimenter.

Many of the· result s

of this experiment t hus can be described as the result s
of experimental demand.

This is also interpretable

from a self-perception theory point of view.

Kiesler,

Roth and Pallak (1974) noted that sometimes subjects
must be directed by the experimenter to consider their
own beliefs

in

order £or the self-perception process

to take place.
And finally f our, subjects may have engaged in
alternative means to r educe their discomfort other than
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attitude change.

For example,. they may have increased

their evaluation of the experimenter, increased their
evaluation of science as a legitimate social enterprise,
increased their

eva~uation

of the classroom credit

they were getting for the experimental participation
or in some other way justified in their own minds why
they were writing down arguments in which they did not
believe.

Given that subjects had such certain, extr·eme

attitudes, it would seem reasonable that they would

try to maintain their attitude position and change
something else to reduce their discomfort.
One

expl~ation

that does not fully account for

the results is the self-perception theory claim that
reinstatement of the initial attitudes ruins the
"dissonance" ef'fect.

This does not explain the lack

of difference between cells four and fourteen and :
between cells ten and fourteen.
The significant differences between cell one and
the cells around it cannot be explained theoretically.
The only logical explanation is that the

random~assign

ment of subjects left six subjects in cell one who
naturally disagreed very much with the topic.

In other

words, some selection effects took place.
The reinstatement manipulation was based on the
essay manipulation succeeding.

That is, the predictions
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were that reinstatement of initial attitudes would ruin
the counterattitudinal manipulation.

Since the advo-

cacy manipulation had no effect, it was impossible to
determine if the re·rnstatement had any effect.
The certainty manipulation is somewhat weak.
Further studies need to find a topic that people will
admit knowing very little about and still find counterattitudinal.
Three suggestions are offered for future research.
First, when subjects are asked to write a counterattitudinal essay, they should be asked to write a
certain minimum length to guarantee that subjects exert
some minimum level of effort in writing the essay.
Second, further work must be done on finding a topic
that subjects find counterattitudinal but about which
they are uncertain.

And third, the experimenter should

introduce a cue for the subjects to consider their
justificatioon for performing the counterattitudinal
behavior just before the posttest.
In summary, none of the three experimental hypotheses was confirmed.

This was because subjects did

not change their attitudes after \ITiting a counterattitudinal essay even though the writing made them
uncomfortable.

This condition was necessary in order

to measure the effects of the other two variables.
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Appendix A
Summary of Procedural Order
Topic

Certain

Attitude
Cell Pre- One
No. test ~iJeek Salience
Delay
1

X

X

2

X

X

show
pretest

4

5

X

X

6
Uncertain

7

X

X

8

X

X

sho\v
pretest
thinlt
about
show
pretest

X

12
Contl~ol

13
14

X

X

show
pretest

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
sho\v

X

pretest

10
11

X

X

X

think
about

9

X
X

think
about

3

Essay Attitude PostSalience test

show
pretest
think
about

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
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Tables of Data Analysis
Table 1
Mean Comfort Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x ·
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Certain Topic
Counterattitudinal Advocacy
Reinstated Initial Attitude

Essay

No Essay

Pretest, Pre-essay

4.50

Pretest, Post-essay

5.50

Think About

J.JJ

2.8J

None

2.33

4.00

N

=6

2.50

for all cells except none/no essay where N = 8.

Table 2
Mean Comfort Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Uncertain Topic
Counterattitudinal Advocacy
Reinstated Initial Attitude

Essay

No Essay

Pretest, Pre-essay

4.50

Pretest, Post-essay

4.50

Think About

4.67

2.67

None

4.33

2.25

N

=6

2.83

for all cells except none/no essay where N

= 8.
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Table 3 ·
Mean Amount of Thought Scores, Certainty of Topic x
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Essay Condition
Topic Certainty
Reinstated Initial Attitudes

Certain

Uncertain

Pretest, Pre-essay

2.00

3.33

Pretest, Post-essay

2.83

4.33

Think About

3.67

4.33

None

3.83

4.33

N

=

6 for all cells.

Table 4
Mean Certainty Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Certain Topic
Counterattitudinal Advocacy
Reinstated Initial Attitudes

Essay

No Essay

Pretest, Pre-essay

6.83

Pretest, Post-essay

4.67

Think About

6.83

5.83

None

6.33

6.38

N

=6

.5.33

for all cells except none/no essay where N = 8.
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Table 5
Mean Certainty Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Uncertain Topic
Counterattitudinal Advocacy
Reinstated Initial Attitude
Pretest, Pre-essay

Essay

No Essay

6.83
6.17

Pretest, Post-essay

5.JJ

Think About

4.83

6.50

None

5.67

6.00

N

=6

for all cells except for none/no essay where N

= 8.

Table 6
Mean Length of Essays, Topic Certainty x Reinstated
Initial Attitude Conditions Within Essay Condition
Topic Certainty
Certain

Uncertain

Pretest, Pre-essay

66.00

62.50

Pretest, Post-essay

51.17

86 .• 50

101.00

102.17

76.33

70.50

Reinstated Initial Attitude

Think About

None
N

=6

for all cells.
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Table 7
Mean Attitude Scores, Counterattitudinal Advocacy x
Reinstated Initial Attitude Conditions, Certain Topic
Counterattitudinal Advocacy
Reinstated Initial Attitude
Pretest, Pre-essay

Essay

1.17

I'·Io Essay

2.JJ

Pretest, Post-essay

) .00

Think About

2.83

2.17

None

3 .33

2.13

N

=6

for all cells except none/no essay where N - 8.

Table 8
Mean Attitude Scores, Counter attitudinal Advocacy x
Reinstated Initial Atti tud e Conditions, Uncertain Topic
Counterattitudinal Advocacy
Reinstated Initial Attitude

Essay

No Essay

Pretest, Pre-essay

1.30

Pretest, Post-essay

2.83

Think About

2.67

J.8J

None

2.17

2

l'l

=

1.50

38

6 for all cells except none/no essay where N - 8.
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Table 9
One-way Analysis

o~

Variance, Comfortable Scale,

Essay v. No Essay
source

ss

between

40.2561

1

within

28).0167

86

total

323.2728

87

*p

d~

rrs

Computed F

Tabled F

40.2561 12.2329*

12.0

3.2908

< .001
Table 10
One-way Analysis of Variance, Think

About Scale, Think About Cells v. All Otners

source

ss

df

IfJ)

1

2.7?78

within

1)6.8889 46

2.9?58

total

139.666?

between

2.7778

Computed F

-9334

Tabled F

4.08

4?
Table 11

One-way Analysis o£ Variance, Think About Scale, Between
Reinstatement of Initial Attitude Levels, Tonics Collapsed
source

ss

between

15.1666

3

within

124.5001

44

total

139.6667

47

df

MS

Computed F

5.0555 1.7867
2.8295

Tabled F

2.84

61
Table 12
One-way Analysis of Varianc e, Certainty Scores,
Certain v. Uncertain Groups, Pilot
source

ss

·err

between

10.5.217

1

10.5217

within

120.9566

44

2.7490

total

131.4783

45

1\':S

Computed F

3.8274

Tabled F

4.08

Table 13
One-way Analysis of Variance, Certainty Scores,
Certain v. Uncertain Groups, Experimental
source ·

ss

between

.4091

1

.4091

within

119.5455

86

1.3900

total

119.9546

87

df

MS

Computed F

.2943

Tabled F

4.00

Table 14
One-way Analysis of Variance, Essay Length, Certain
Topic, Between Reinstatement of Initial Attitude Levels
source

ss

df

rJlS

Computed F

Tabled F

1.3748

3.10

between

7915.4582 3

2638.4860

within

38382.1668 20

1919.1083

total

4629?.6250 23
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Table 15
One-way Analysis of

~ariance,

Essay Length, Uncertain

Topic, Between Reinstatement of Initial Attitude Levels

ss

source

. -·- - df

WIS

Computed F

3

1858.8333

2.6200

within

14189.3334 20

709.4666

total

19765.8334 23

between

5576.5000

Tabled ·F

3.10

Table 16
One-way Analysis of Variance, Essay Length,
Certain x Uncertain Groups

ss

source

df

r~1s

1

553.5208

within 66063.4584 46

1436.1621

between

55J~5208

Computed F

.3854

Tabled F

4.08

66616.9792 47

total

Table 17
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change,
Certain x Uncertain Groups
source

ss

between

.1023

1

.1023

within

221.6137

86

2.5769

total

221.7160

87

df

MS

Computed F

.0396

Tabled F

4.00

63
Table 18
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change,

Essay x No Essay
- --df

source

ss

between

.)410

1

.3410

within

221.3750

86

2.5741

total

221.7160

87

Computed F

filS

Tabled F

.1324

4.00

Table 19
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change,
Pretest x Think About x None Reinstatement Levels

ss

source
between

df

MS

• Computed F

7.8211

2

3.9105

within

21J.e949

85

2.5164

total

221.7160

87

.Tabled

1.5540

F

3.15

Table 20
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change,
Essay v. No Essay, Certain Topic
source

ss

df

~JiS

2.8189

1

2.8189

within

128.1584

42

3.1513

total

130.9773 43

between

Computed F
.9238

Tabled F
4.08
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Table 21
One-way Analysis of Variance, Attitude Change,
Essay v. No Essay, Uncertain Topic
.. - df

source

ss

between

.7280

1

.7280

VIi thin

89.9084

42

2.1406

total

90.6364 43

~JIS

Computed F
.)400

Tabled F
4.08
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